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In the 1970s and the 1980s the old problem of the business cycle once again
moved to the forefront of the economic profession's active interest. Among
the most intensely debated issues is that of continuity versus change in cycli-
cal behavior. Are business cycles all alike? Have they changed in any system-
atic way and, ifso, why?
The purpose of this chapter is to review in a selective and critical way the
recent developments and literature bearing on these questions. I examine the
hypothesis that the U.S. economy was cyclically less unstable after World War
II than before and concentrate on the role ofstructural, institutional, and pol-
icy changes.
3.1 Have Business Cycles Moderated?
3.1.1 Problems with Old and New Data
The main novelties in the post-World War II business cycles include a shift
toward longer expansions and shorter as well as shallower contractions in ag-
gregate output and employment, combined with a persistence ofinflation dur-
ing peacetime recessions (see chapter 2, sec. 2.2.1; and Zamowitz and Moore
1986). How well documented are these developments? What are their princi-
pal sources, consequences, and implications? Substantial work on these ques-
tions has been done in the last few years, much ofit published in voluminous
proceedings from a 1984 NBER conference (Gordon 1986a).
The earliest influential statement that a significant "progress towards eco-
nomic stability" is under way was made by Bums (1960). Later data con-
firmed in large measure Bums's analysis and projections, according to the
new NBER studies (Gordon 1986b).
However, Romer (1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d, and 1987a) presents new
7778 Chapter Three
annual series for GNP, 1869-1918, and the unemployment rate, 1890-1930,
and argues that the greater stability of the U.S. economy in the postwar era
compared with the pre-1930 era is mainly a "figment of the data." She con-
structs estimates for the postwar period imitating the procedures used by the
creators of the historical estimates (Kuznets 1946, 1961; Shaw 1947; Leber-
gott 1964) and shows that her artificial data are about as volatile as their se-
ries. She then produces her own series for selected periods before the Great
Depression, using regression index methods that in effect force the prewar
data to reflect certain postwar relationships. Not surprisingly, these rearranged
series are considerably smoother and have smaller cyclical amplitudes than
the corresponding original estimates, being in both respects more similar to
the postwar data.
It is certainly true, and well known, that the information-gathering and
measurement techniques available to the pioneers in U.S. historical statistics
were inferior to those that we have now. Yet it does not necessarily follow that
simply imposing the recent patterns on the old data will improve the latter.
Just to mention some of the assumptions that must hold true for Romer's
methods to be applicable; her unemployment revisions require that the output-
employment relations in each sector, the cyclicality of labor force participa-
tion rates, and the sectoral composition ofemployment all be the same in both
the pre-1930 and post-1948 periods (Weir 1986). Yet at least some of these
assumptions have already been falsified by the data. The same goes for the
Romer GNP series where, for example, the elasticity of GNP to commodity
output in terms of deviations from trend is taken to be the same before 1918
as after 1948. The implicit theorizing behind these calculations ignores the
structural and other changes that occurred in the economy over the past cen-
tury (see sec. 3.3). More fundamentally still, Romer's estimation procedure
precludes any possibility of stabilization, thus making her conclusion inevi-
table and prejudging the issue in question (Lebergott 1986).
In support of Romer's position (but not her approach), it can be said that
much of the direct historical evidence consists of cyclically sensitive series,
which would indeed exaggerate the fluctuations in the economy at large, as
noted in chapter 7 (Zarnowitz 1981). Although not overlooked by Kuznets
and others who created the basic macroeconomic series for the United States,
this problem ofa possible bias results just from lack ofdata and so has no real
solution short ofintroducing new pertinent historical information.
Regrettably, no one can create comprehensive historical time series where
the required data simply do not exist. But several considerations suggest that
the problem is less critical that it appears. (1) Monthly indexes ofcommercial
and industrial activity exist for the United States in trend-adjusted form since
1834, without trend adjustments since 1882. They have a broad coverage in
terms of the industries and processes important at the time: manufacturing,
mining, agricultural marketings, construction, railway freight ton-miles, elec-
tric power, foreign-trade volume. The sectors worst represented, notably pri-79 The Modem Evolution of U.S. Economic Fluctuations
vate and government services, played a much smaller role in earlier times than
in the last four decades. (2) Historically, business contractions used to be ac-
companied by declines in financial and nominal aggregates or indexes: secu-
rity prices, bonds and shares traded, interest rates, business failures (in-
verted), bank clearings, and commodity and wholesale prices. The evidence
from these series tends to confirm the evidence from indexes of real activity
with regard to the identification and dating of business cycles. (3) Further
support for the historical chronology of business expansions and contractions
created by the NBER comes from accounts ofcontemporary observers (busi-
ness annals), the directional consensus of series on real and financial activity
and prices (diffusion indexes), and chronologies independently derived by
others (Bums and Mitchell 1946, ch. 4; see also chapter 7). All ofthis infor-
mation also helps to compare business cycles and rank expansions by their
vigor and contractions by their severity.
3.1.2. Evidence for Changes in Volatility
Figures 3.1-3.3 help us compare the variability of real GNP, the wholesale
price index, and money supply, M2, over three subperiods ofthe last century:
1875-1918, 1919-45, and 1946-83. To concentrate on short-run relative
changes and counteract heteroscedasticity, series oflog differences are used.
The graphs and the associated descriptive statistics (table 3. 1) provide
strong indications that the rates ofchange in output, prices, and money (q, p,
and m, respectively) all tended to be much less volatile after 1945 than in
either ofthe two earlier eras. Thus, the standard deviations for 1875-1918 are
about 1.5-2times larger and those for 1919-45 are 2-3 times larger than their
counterparts for 1946-83 (table 3.1, col. 4, lines 1-12). The coefficients of
variation (ratios of standard deviations to means) yield identical rankings of
the subperiods (cols. 4, 5, and 9). The interquartile ranges give similar re-
sults.
The averages of q and m do not differ strongly across the subperiods,
whereas the averages ofp do, reflecting the mixture ofinflation and deflation
in 1875-1918, the prevalence ofdeflation in the interwar period, and the per-
sistent inflation ofrecent times. For q, the medians exceed the means, and the
skewness measures (not shown) are negative throughout. For m and p, the
distributions are skewed negatively in the 1920s and 1930s only (cf. cols. 3
and 6.)
Besides having generally larger fluctuations, q, p, and m also show higher
proportions ofnegative signs in the first decades covered than in the last four.
The curves in figures 3.1-3.3 fall much more often and further below the zero
level in 1875-1945 than in 1945-83. In the latter period, aggregate level de-
clines were relatively infrequent for real GNP and rare indeed for the broad
indexes of producer (and consumer) prices and measures of the stock of
money.
The quarterly changes in the rate on prime commercial paper (i) show great80 Chapter Three
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Fig. 3.1 Quarterly changes in real gross national product, log differences,
1875-1983
volatility in 1875-1918 and more persistence in the two later periods (fig.
3.4).1 A very conspicuous feature here is the sharp contrast between the am-
plitudes of i in 1933-53 and thereafter. This reflects the strong heteroscedas-
ticity ofinterest rates: the higher their levels, the larger their changes. Clearly,
too, the very high variability ofthe nominal interest rates in the second halfof
the post-1945 period is closely related to rising inflation, recurrent attempts
to disinflate, and the resulting instability of inflationary expectations. In
1875-1945 inflation did not persist in peacetime but alternated with deflation.
Indeed, it is only in the last quarter-century or so that expectations ofa "sec-
ular" inflation developed, driving up interest. The short-term sensitivity ofthe
price level declined, but recessions and major slowdowns typically induced
temporary reductions in the rate ofinflation, which helped to make the recent
movements in the general level ofinterest rates decidedly procyclical.
According to standard deviations ofi, the variability ofshort-term rates was
somewhat greater in 1946-83 than in 1875-1918 and was lowest in 1919-45
(table 3.1, col. 4, lines 13-16). The corresponding measures for log differ-
ences show a nearly perfect tie between the three subperiods, with standard
deviations of about O. 13 for each ofthem. Thus, logarithmic transformations
remove virtually all ofthe observed heteroscedasticity.
I. This is probably due to the effects ofthe dissolution ofthe gold standard and/or the founding
and activities ofthe Federal Reserve System (Barsky et al. 1988). The series on the 4- to 6-month
paper is used here because of its homogeneity over the entire period 1890-1980 (Gordon 1982a,
p. 1114). The data for 1875-89 are for the commercial paper rate in New York City (Macaulay
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Fig.3.2 Quarterly changes in wholesale (producer) price index, log
differences, 1875-1983
3.1.3 Evidence for Changes in Cyclical Behavior
The measures discussed in the previous section are based on variations over
short unit periods such as quarters or years, not on variations over intermedi-
ate periods of varying length that are characteristic of business cycles. They
therefore reflect strongly the influence of short erratic movements and are
probably better viewed as estimates ofvolatility than ofcyclicality. Moreover,
they do not distinguish between expansions and contractions in economic ac-
tivity. To examine changes in the durations and magnitudes ofcyclical fluctua-
tions, there is still no alternative to the reference cycle method applied in the
historical NBER studies.
No systematic changes over time can be detected in the total duration of
business cycles, which averaged about 4 years, give or take a few months,
before and after World War II. But the relative length ofcycle phases changed
dramatically: in 1885-1945, for example, business expansions were less than
twice as long as contractions; in 1945-82 they were 3-4 times as long (see
Zarnowitz and Moore 1986, tables 9.1 and 9.4). Or to put it differently, the
proportions of time in contractions averaged more than 30%-40% in the six
decades beginning in 1885 but only 20%-25% in the four decades following
1945. This finding does not depend significantly on the incidence of wars or
the few doubtful links in the chronology that may represent slowdowns, rather
than absolute declines, in macroeconomic activity.
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Fig. 3.3 Quarterly changes in money supply (M2), log differences, 1875-1983
and rises (E) in industrial activity and employment, contractions became not
only much shorter but also much milder in the post-World War II cycles.
Expansions also moderated greatly but less than contractions, so the E/C am-
plitude ratios increased. The employment ratios for 1885-1912, 1912-45,
and 2.3, 1.8, and 5.0, respectively.2 These changes are large and quite un-
likely to be statistical artifacts, although they may well be overstated because
ofthe differences between the historical and recent data.
Table 3.2 lists the average durations and amplitudes of fluctuations in the
levels ofthe four variables whose quarter-to-quarter variability was examined
above with the aid of figures 3.1-3.4. Also included here is the series of
current-dollar GNP estimates, which helps to document that prices and values
were historically no less cyclical than quantities. However, GNP had no de-
clines after 1960, nor did the wholesale price index after 1967 (lines 3, 6,
and 9).
The shift toward longer expansions and shorter contractions can be seen
clearly by comparing the post-1945 duration measures for nominal and real
GNP, prices, and interest rates with their counterparts for the pre-World War
I and interwar periods (col. 5-6). History shows that monetary aggregates
had declines associated with major business contractions, which are few and
far between, and only slowdowns marking the milder recessions. Indeed, M2





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.87 The Modem Evolution of U.S. Economic Fluctuations
(and Ml) had no declines of any cyclical persistence at all after the 1948-49
recession (lines 10-12). The period 1918-38 featured the longest and the
post-World War II era the shortest and least frequent cyclical downswings in
all cases (as well as for several other related variables that were examined).
For all but one ofthese series, too, the declines were on average the largest
in the interwar and the smallest in the post-1945 era (col. 8). The exception is
the commercial paper rate, where these ranks are reversed. The same relation-
ship applies to the per-quarter amplitudes of fall (col. 10). The differences in
size among the average rises are relatively smaller and less systematic across
the variables (cols. 7 and 9). Worth noting, however, are the large percentage
amplitudes of expansions in income, output, and prices during the interwar
period and in interest rates during 1946-83.
3.1.4 Qualifying and Interpreting the Results
The main point emerging from this examination of the data is that the hy-
pothesis ofreduced cyclical instability in the last 40 years receives broad sup-
port from independently compiled series on several principal aggregative var-
iables. The underlying historical data come from well-known sources: for real
income, Gallman and Kuznets; wholesale prices, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
money, Friedman and Schwartz; interest rates, Macaulay and the Commercial
and Financial Chronicle. Balke and Gordon (1986a) present quarterly series
on levels ofthese (and other related) variables.
The least dependable of the historical estimates under review are probably
those for quarterly real GNP. Balke and Gordon obtained them by interpolat-
ing the annual series with the index of industrial production and trade from
Persons (1931) for the period 1875-1930 and the Federal Reserve industrial
production index for 1931-45. The method of interpolation is state ofthe art
and well employed, but the quarterly series used as interpolators have, inevi-
tably, limited and selected coverage. 3 However, comparisons ofmore reliable
annual output series produce qualitatively similar conclusions (Baily 1978,
esp. pp. 13-18).
The detrended real GNP series had standard deviations of2. 1 in 1950-80,
according to current Department of Commerce data, and 3.4-4.5 in 1872-
3. The interpolation procedure follows Jhat ofChow and Lin (1971), assumes that the quarterly
errors are subject to an AR(I) process, and allows for a constant and a linear time trend (Gordon
and Veitch 1986, pp. 328-35). The index of industrial production and trade is based on bank
clearings outside New York City, 1875-1914; pig iron production, 1877-1918; imports of mer-
chandise, 1903-14; gross earnings of leading railroads, 1903-14; employment, 1903-18; cotton
consumption, 1915-18; net ton-miles of freight, 1915-18; electric power production, 1919-30;
index of volume of manufacturing, 1919-30; railroad car loadings, 1919-30; construction con-
tracts, deflated, 1919-30; and index of volume of mining, 1919-30 (Persons 1931, chs. 7-10,
passim). The uneven and spotty nature of the compilation, especially before 1903, is beyond
question, yet there is no way to quantify the errors of the resulting estimates. Other available
indexes ofbusiness activity have similarshortcomings and none is demonstrably superiorto others
(see also chapter 7).88 Chapter Three
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Fig. 3.4 Quarterly changes in commercial paper rate, 1875-1983
1928, according to the Gallman-Kuznets-Commerce estimates (Balke and
Gordon 1986b). The corresponding Romer figure for 1872-1928 is 2.8, much
smaller than the others but still significantly above that for 1950-80. Standard
deviations of annual changes in real and nominal GNP, business fixed invest-
ment, and civilian employment were 2.1-2.4 times larger in 1891-1914 than
in the post-World War II period, according to a list of estimates in Schultze
1986 (p. 61). For nonfarm aggregate hours worked, manufacturing produc-
tion, steel production, and money supply (M2), the corresponding ratios are
1.7-1.8. These comparisons are based on relatively reliable data and they ex-
clude the perhaps uniquely volatile interval between 1914 and 1945.
It is also useful to examine changes in long and reasonably consistent series
on individual production series in physical units, as did Romer (1987b). Here
standard deviations offirst differences in the logarithms ofdata on 11 agricul-
tural goods, 14 mineral products, and 13 manufactured commodities are pre-
sented for the prewar (1889-1914), interwar (1922-39), and postwar (1947-
84) periods. 4 The prewar-to-postwar ratios for these measures average 1.2,
1.1, 1.5, and 1.2 for farming, mining, manufacturing, and all products, re-
spectively. The corresponding statistics for the interwar-to-postwar ratios are
1.8, 2.0, 1.4, and 1.8. I interpret these results to indicate a tendency for these
series to show less volatility in the post-World War II era than in the quarter
century before World War I and the highest volatility in the interwar years. In
4. Data on refined sugar production are not available for the interwar period, and data on beer
and distilled spirits production are influenced by the end of Prohibition in 1933-34. Hence, the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.91 The Modern Evolution ofU.S. Economic Fluctuations
my view, the overall evidence clearly supports this ranking,5 even though
Romer herselfprefers to stress that the prewar-postwar differences are small.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that moderation of business cycles
does not necessarily require a diminution over time in fluctuations ofindivid-
ual products or even industries. Even with no change in the dimensions of
these movements, a shift in the relative importance from sectors characterized
by large fluctuations (such as manufactured goods) to sectors characterized by
small fluctuations (such as services) would reduce the overall instability ofthe
economy. As shown elsewhere and below, the structure of the economy has
indeed undergone a major shift ofthis nature (Zamowitz and Moore 1986).
Other developed economies have followed similar historical trends. In
Sheffrin 1988, estimates ofthe dispersion ofannual growth rates in output for
six European countries are all larger for 1871-1914 than for 1951-84, but
generally not by much. Backus and Kehoe (1988) add several countries for
which relatively good annual data on national income for the period are avail-
able. They find that the standard deviations of detrended long output series
were 1.1-2.5 times larger in the pre-World War I years than in the post-World
War II years for Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. Comparable ratios for series of log differences tend to be somewhat
larger. The corresponding estimates for the United States are 1.8-2.1. The
variability ofoutput in most countries was much higher in the interwar period
than in the postwar period, with ratios ranging from 1.2 to 3.6 for log differ-
ences. (For the United States, the figure is 3.1.)
In sum, there are good reasons to agree with Weir (1986, p. 365), whose
conclusion from comprehensive tests and a critique of Romer's results is that
"to the simple question of whether cyclical fluctuations around trend in GNP
and unemployment have become smaller since World War II the data are more
than adequate to deliver a definitive answer: yes." Similarly, Balke and G,or-
don (1986b, p. 3), after presenting a new regression index for real GNP,
1869-1908, based on Romer's "backcasting" method but using in part differ-
ent and additional data, find "not a shred ofevidence to support the view that
the greater volatility ofreal GNP before 1929 is 'spurious.' "Myown view is
that the historical series are indeed more likely to err in the direction of too
much than too little volatility. But this bias is (1) not all necessarily "cyclical";
(2) partly offset by shifts in weights that tend to favor the cyclically more
stable sectors; and (3) almost certainly too small overall to refute the hypoth-
esis ofa significant stabilization in the postwar period (relative not only to the
interwar but also to the pre-World War I era).
5. For example, when medians are used, the prewar-postwar ratio for all comparable 35 series
is still 1.2, and the interwar-postwar ratio is 1.5.92 Chapter Three
3.2 What May Have Caused the Changes in Cyclical Behavior?
3.2.1 A List of Hypotheses
In section 3.1, I argued that the hypothesis ofreduced economic instability
is supported by a comparative analysis of a variety of pre- and post-World
War II data for the United States. What are the possible sources of the ob-
served moderation ofthe business cycles?
Several explanations have been proposed or are possible. They can be iden-
tified briefly and grouped broadly, as follows.
I. Structural changes in the private economy
A. Shifts toward cyclically more stable components ofdemand
B. Shifts toward cyclically more stable industries, occupations, and
incomes
II. Increase in the size of government, a sector that does not decline in
recessions
III. Institutional changes
A. Rise of the fiscal "automatic stabilizers"-procyclical income
taxes, countercyclical transfer payments and welfare benefits
B. Postdepression financial reforms such as federal insurance pro-
grams for bank deposits (combined with discretionary lender-of-
last-resort actions), savings and loan accounts, and mortgages
C. Private stabilizing arrangements-pension plans, maintained cor-
porate dividends
IV. Discretionary policies (fiscal or monetary or both) resulting in the fol-
lowing effects (which can be interpreted as a change in the propagation
mechanism [see factor V below] or smaller shocks to the economy [see
factor VIA below]):
A. Reductions in the variability ofaggregate demand (nominal GNP)
B. Reductions in the variability ofaggregate supply in response to the
greater stability ofdemand
V. Gains in learning and confidence:
A. Consumers and entrepreneurs learn from history (which reflects the
operation of factors I-IV above) to expect less cyclical instability
in the future
B. Their greater confidence leads them to modify their behavior in
ways that help stabilize the economy
VI. Smaller shocks to the economy
A. Decreased shifts to aggregate demand (nominal GNP) due to coun-
tercyclical and counterinflationary discretionary policies, institu-
tional and structural changes, and gains in confidence (factors I-V
above)
B. Decreased shifts in aggregate private demand (consumption, invest-93 The Modern Evolution ofU.S. Economic Fluctuations
ment, exports) due to greater stability in preferences and/or accu-
mulation ofwealth and capital
C. Decreased shifts in aggregate supply due to greater stability in tech-
nical progress and/or in expectations ofprofits
VII. Gains in technology, information, and knowledge
A. Reduced inventory fluctuations through better management tech-
niques (using advances in economic models and data production
and analysis)
B. Fewer major policy errors and better guidance from economic ad-
visers and forecasters
VIII. Changes in the flexibility ofwages and prices
A. Past business contractions aggravated by deflation and deflationary
expectations
B. Stickier money wages and prices in the postwar era
C. On balance, the greater stickiness makes for more stability
3.2.2 Some Observations and Plan ofProcedure
The above list is purposely inclusive and there are some overlaps, as indi-
cated. Some of the hypotheses are widely accepted (notably III), some are
much discussed and very controversial (II, IV, and VIII), and still others are
mere possibilities, little explored and perhaps remote (VIB, VIC, and VII).
All are at best partial, more than one may be valid, and none need be domi-
nant. Hence the proper strategy is not to test them against each other but rather
to consider that they may apply in some combination. Ideally, one would wish
to quantify the contributions of all factors that prove relevant, but this very
ambitious goal is well beyond our present reach.
The last set ofhypotheses in the list (VIII) concerns matters ofgreat analyt-
ical importance and difficulty. They are treated separately in chapter4.
The next section of this chapter deals with the first two topics in our list,
that is, structural changes and the expansion of government. In section 3.4 I
examine the third set of hypotheses, and in section 3.5 I look at the role of
macroeconomic policies and related changes in the behavior ofprivate agents
(hypotheses IV and V). I shall have little to say about the other possibilities
listed under VI and VII. The last section ofthe chapter sums up the results.
3.3 Structural Changes and the Size of Government
3.3.1 Components ofExpenditures
Real consumer expenditures on durable goods have large fluctuations, most
of which correspond well to business cycles, allowing for some tendency to
lead (see table 3.3, lines 1 and 7, for a summary of the interwar and postwar































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.95 The Modern Evolution ofU.S. Economic Fluctuations
relatively small cyclical movements even in the turbulent interwar period, ris-
ing and falling on the average about one third as much as the durables (cf.
lines 1 and 2). In 1947-83, nondurable goods had only a few declines, none
longer than 1 quarter, and services rose continuously at growth rates substan-
tially exceeding those ofgoods consumption.6
The main reason for the observed sharp differences is simple: durable goods
are accumulated, render services, and depreciate over time, and their pur-
chases are postponable. Hence, the sensitivity to business cycles ofthese pur-
chases is typically high. There is no reason why this relationship should have
varied over time or should not persist in the future. The demand for services
is relatively stable in part because services cannot be stored. The nondurables
fall in between.
Of course, major depressions would be associated with larger declines ex-
tending to nondurable goods and services as well. Even a lengthy stagnation
of growth in real wages and disposable personal income can substantially re-
duce the consumer and business demand for many short-lived goods and ser-
vices, particularly in the face of weak labor market conditions and persistent
uncertainty about the economic outlook. This is what happened as a result of
the protracted period of subnormal growth since early 1989, although the
recession in 1990-91 was relatively mild.
New and replacement demands for plant and equipment and housing give
rise to outputs of durable capital goods and structures, which, like the con-
sumer durables, have large fluctuations and high conformity to business
cycles. In 1919-41, the cyclical swings in business investment (producers'
durable equipment and nonresidential structures) were huge, exceeding those
in household investment (consumer durables and housing). In 1947-83,
movements in all these aggregates were on the average more nearly equal in
percentage terms (compare the corresponding entries in cols. 8 and 9).
The cyclical conformity of the investment series was high both before and
after World War II (cols 2-5). Inventory investment, though always very vol-
atile, also moved in both periods in a basically procyclical fashion.
7 Timing
shifted to longer leads at peaks in the postwar era (cols. 6-7).
Studies that employ variance-analytic methods produce further informa-
tion, with generally similar results. When total fixed investment is defined to
include consumer durables as well as producers' durable equipment and resi-
dential and nonresidential structures, its variance accounts for about one quar-
ter ofthe variance ofreal GNP in the interwar and postwar periods alike (Gor-
don and Veitch 1986, pp. 299-300). However, the components of this broad
6. Measures ofthe type used in table 3.3 are not available for the levels of these aggregates in
the postwar period (to show any cyclical movements, the series have to be differenced).
7. Note the change from short lags to long leads at peaks (lines 6 and 11, col. 6). As for the
frequencies of the "extra" turns (cols. 4 and 5), they relate to specific cycle movements that are
generally at least 2 quarters long; had I counted all directional reversals, their number would have
been much larger, especially for inventory investment with its frequent short oscillations.96 Chapter Three
concept of private investment show much larger covariance in 1919-41 than
in the recent era. The contribution of nonresidential structures fell and that of
consumer durables rose strongly. Further, the covariance between total invest-
ment and the rest of output was large and positive in 1919-41 and small and
negative in 1947-83. This is consistent with the notion that government
spending crowded out some investment in postwar years.
Inventory investment continued to playa major role in the recent business
cycles, especially at turning points and in contractions. Indeed, properly mea-
sured in comparison to 1929-41, the variance of inventory investment in-
creased after World War II, whereas that of final sales decreased strongly
(Blinder and Holtz-Eakin 1986). These findings are not surprising, since the
recent era was one of relatively short and mild aggregate fluctuations, and it
has long been known that inventory changes are particularly important in just
this type of cycle (Abramovitz 1950). Compared with the mostly moderate
cycles of 1919-29, the share of inventory investment was larger in the post-
war GNP contractions but smaller in expansions.
The variability of output tends to exceed that of final sales in all periods,
which is difficult to reconcile with the popular buffer stock model, in which
inventory adjustments are supposed to smooth production in the face of ran-
dom shocks to demand.8 Presumably, inventories are held in large part for
other reasons, such as to facilitate production at all its stages and counteract
the procyclical delivery lags and uncertainties ofvendor performance.
The hypothesis that better inventory control reduced instability (see factor
VIlA on our list) receives only weak support from these results. Nevertheless,
it is premature to dismiss it. The variability of real inventory investment
tended to decline in 1948-65 (Brooks and Gigante 1979); it increased later
through 1983 but remained relatively low during the following 6 years. Surely
in this area the promise of progress through computerized information tech-
nology looms large.
Has the structure ofGNP by type ofexpenditure changed so as to contribute
to the observed moderation ofthe business cycle in the postwar period? Such
a change could take the form ofa shift form the highly variable investment to
the relatively stable comparison components. But the average share in real
GNP of consumption of nondurables and services actually declined from
about 65% to 54% between 1919-41 and 1947-83. Halfof the resulting gap
was offset by the rise from 18% to 24% in the combined share of consumer
durable goods and gross private domestic investment. The other half was
taken up by the increase in government purchases of goods and services, a
generally acyclical GNP component, from 17% to 22%. In the private sphere,
8. Evidence from other countries supports that for the United States in this regard (West 1988).
On the issues in the current debate concerning the sources ofinventory fluctuations and the role of
inventories as a cyclical propagation mechanism, see Maccini 1987 and chapter 2, sec. 2.3.5 and
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then, the shift would appear to have been in the destabilizing, rather than
stabilizing, direction (the role ofincreased government is considered below).9
It seems safe to eliminate the changes in the consumption-investment mix
ofthe private demands on output as a major source ofthe reduction in cyclical
instability.
3.3.2 Shifts in the Structure ofEmployment
The industrial composition ofemployment shifted in the long run from the
categories that are highly recession prone to those that are not. 10 The set of
major industries that are generally cyclical or volatile includes manufacturing,
mining, construction, transportation, communications, and public utilities;
they produce mostly goods but also some important capital-intensive services.
The combined share of these industries in total employment increased from
29% in 1869 to 41 % in 1948-53 and then declined to 32% in 1979-81. The
rest of the private nonfarm sector-that is, trade, finance, insurance, real es-
tate, and services in a narrow sense (professional, personal, business, and
repair services)-is on the whole not very cyclical. The employment share of
these industries gained steadily from about 19% in 1869 to 45% in 1979-81.
The proportion of government employment, which does not vary systemati-
cally with the business cycle, rose approximately from 4% to 20% between
1869 and 1979-81. I I The total of the acyclical services and government ac-
counted for about 23% of national employment in 1869,44% in 1929-37,
and 64% in 1979-81.
The share ofagriculture, measured in the same terms, dropped enormously
from an estimated 48% in 1869 to little more than 3% in 1979-81. Farm
output is not very sensitive to fluctuations in aggregate demand, but farm
prices are sufficiently so that alternations of financial prosperity and distress
in agriculture played a considerable role in the historical record of business
cycles. Rough estimates based on historical data of Shaw, Goldsmith, and
Kuznets suggest that the standard deviations of annual log differences de-
clined between 1893-1915/1923-40 and 1947-82 by 67% for total output,
65% for nonfarm output, 57% for private output, and 56% for private nonfarm
output (De Long and Summers 1986a, p. 686). These reductions are all very
9. It is true that the GNP shares themselves show some cyclical variation, which affects our
comparisons. During business contractions the percentage ofconsumption usually increases and
that of investment decreases; and the postwar contractions were short and mild in contrast to the
interwar ones. However, these differences are mostly small and irregular. For example, the share
ofgross private nonresidential fixed investment in GNP averaged 10.2% in the 7 trough years and
10.7% in the 7 peak years ofthe 1953-83 period (with standard deviations of 1.1% in both cases).
10. Employment is defined in terms of "'persons engaged in production," which includes full-
time workers, part-time workers converted to full-time equivalents, and self-employed workers.
II. This covers general government at all levels, including the armed forces, plus a relatively
small component of "'government enterprise" (only the latter may be more appropriately thought
ofas producing goods rather than services).98 Chapter Three
large and they may well be overstated, but what matters here are the differ-
ences between them, which are negligible for the total versus nonfarm and
sizable for the total versus private comparisons. This implies that the changing
role of agriculture was of little significance in this context, and the changing
role ofgovernment had a stabilizing influence.
De Long and Summers, using only three measurements, in effect dismiss
summarily all "accounting explanations" (i.e., the linking of the change in
cyclical variability to structural shifts) as being of little importance. But their
method and estimates are open to serious criticism, particularly because they
consider only the changing roles ofagriculture and government and ignore the
great increase in the weight ofprivate service industries. 12
A strong argument can be made that the shift in the employment structure
had much to do with the moderation of cyclical fluctuations of total employ-
ment in the post-World War II period. However, this factor was increasingly
important after 1950, when the combined weight of the more cyclical sector
fell below 50% and 40%; though oflong standing, it probably played a much
lesser role in earlier times.
Also, it is noteworthy that public and private services, as a broadly defined
category, although scoring great gains in terms of employment, grew much
more slowly in terms ofoutput. Average labor productivity, as measured, in-
creased far less in services industries than in the production ofgoods «Fuchs
1968). According to recent Department of Commerce statistics in 1982 dol-
lars, services already accounted for 41% ofreal GNP in 1929, with the share
of goods being 43% and that of structures 16%. In 1985, the corresponding
estimates are 46% for services, again 43% for goods, and 11% for structures.
In sum, the hypothesis that structural shifts contributed to the moderation
of postwar business cycles should be neither rejected nor viewed as self-
sufficient. It is a valid but partial explanation that leaves much room for the
other hypotheses.
3.3.3 The Effects ofIncreased Government
For the government to be able to raise the average level of real economic
activity merely by growing itself and thus adding to total employment, two
conditions are necessary. First, the private economy must suffer from deficient
aggregate demand much ofthe time, and second, government and private ac-
tivities must be on the whole complementary. That this should be so seems
inconsistent with the idea shared by mainstream economists ofvarious persua-
sions that the steady state or long-run condition ofthe market economy is one
of full-employment equilibrium. But in the real world the economies are
12. The approach does not distinguish between cyclical and other short-term movements and
between expansions and contractions (see comment by Eisner 1986, pp. 721-22). Also, the esti-
mates before 1929 are based on several major assumptions about the proportion offarm output in
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mixed, involving governments as well as markets, and their equilibrium prop-
erties should depend on the relative size (and also on the quality of financing
and functioning) of their public sectors. Government growth may be benefi-
cial when proceeding from suboptimal size but may be detrimental when car-
ried too far.
In fact, the massive unemployment ofthe 1930s in the United States, what-
ever its cause, was finally eliminated only by the rapid defense buildup asso-
ciated with the outbreak ofthe war in Europe. After World War II, the govern-
ment remained much larger than it had been before, and the growth of its
spending not only stimulated consumption but also kept up business profits
and investment. U.S. foreign aid was a major factor in the recovery of the
recipient countries and the reinvigoration of world trade. It is now widely
acknowledged that the 1950s and 1960s constituted a golden era of relatively
high and stable real growth in the then increasingly "mixed" economies ofthe
Western world. 13
However, the high wave of confidently expanding, activist government
crested before long, perhaps already in the late 1960s, amidst growing worries
about the course of the unpopular Vietnam War. In the 1970s the public be-
came increasingly aware ofthe rising trends in inflation, interest rates, unem-
ployment, and tax burdens. The oil price hikes hurt and so did the intermittent
policy efforts to disinflate, which added to the cyclical instability in the mid-
1970s and the early 1980s. For all this, the blame fell on what seemed the
heavy and clumsy hand ofgovernment.
These developments helped promote antistatist ideas. The larger the gov-
ernment, the greater its capacity to interfere with efficient markets and be itself
a source of major disturbances. Some government activities compete with or
preempt business activities, sufficiently high tax rates diminish private initia-
tives, and some policy actions have large adverse effects on the economy.
Inflationary policies, in particular, are a major source of macroeconomic in-
stability. 14 The long-proposed remedies involve fiscal and monetary conserv-
atism, deregulation, and privatization, that is, generally a reduction of the
relative size and power of the government. Political programs along these
lines gained much support in recent years, spreading from the United States
and Britain to many countries. 15
It is difficult to define the "size" of the government and distinguish the di-
13. See Eisner 1986 for a recent formulation of the argument that higher real government ex-
penditures raised both the Hicksian "floor" and "ceiling" levels of real GNP during the business
cycles ofthe postwar era in the United States.
14. The extreme case is that of the inflation tax used by a government that is too large and too
costly, unable to raise much revenue by regular tax collection, and hence trying to finance itself
by issuing new money. The results, as in most Latin American countries in the 1980s, are disas-
trously high inflations and attempts to disinflate and reduce foreign-debt burdens, often accompa-
nied by business stagnation ordepression.
15. Including, after the 1989 debacle ofcommunist regimes, the nations ofCentral and Eastern
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rect consequences ofits growth from the related effectiveness offiscal built-in
stabilizers and the potential (for good or bad) for discretionary policies; still,
these are in principle distinct matters. One of the relevant measures is the ra-
tio of total real government purchases of goods and services (G) to total real
GNP (Q). The acyclical behavior of the upward trending G translates into a
mildly countercyclical behavior of G/Q. That is, the ratio tends to be higher
at troughs than at peaks ofbusiness cycles, and this can be seen just as clearly
before as after World War II. By this criterion, any stabilizing effects from the
growth ofG were only moderate between the interwar and the postwar periods
and nonexistent between the pre- and post-1970 parts ofthe latter era. This is
suggested by the following average value of G/Q, in percentages at the quar-
terly dates ofbusiness cycle peaks (P) and troughs (T): 16
5P, 1920-37:14 8p, 1948-81:19 4p, 1953-69:20 3p, 1973-81:19
5T, 1921-38:17 8T, 1949-82:20 4T, 1954-70:21 3T, 1975-82:20
Since the large reduction of the federal income rates in 1981, the federal
budget deficits, as conventionally measured, ran consistently high. Public
spending responded weakly and was maintained at an approximately stable
proportion ofGNP. State and local governments had to assume a larger share
of taxing the public and providing programmed services. Pressures against
expanding total government expenditures intensified and became generally
more effective. As a result, the tax system grew more regressive, government
interest payments rose sharply, and complaints about the neglect of public
spending, especially on the infrastructure, multiplied. The government may
have ceased growing in relative size but the expected gains in efficiency never
materialized.
In the Western world, governments vary substantially in size relative to the
private economies, judging by the conventional criteria of comparing their
budgets with the respective GNP or GDP figures. Several European countries
with good records ofmacroeconomic growth and stability have proportionally
larger public sectors than the United States has. But the shift from the prevail-
ing optimism about the growing governments and their economic perform-
ance in the 1950s and 1960s to the increasing concern about excessive gov-
ernment expansion and economic powers in the 1970s and 1980s was a
widespread, international phenomenon. The initial gains from the process
may have become exhausted, while its negative aspects have gradually be-
come apparent.
16. Note that G/Q at P in 1948:4 was 14 and at Tin 1949:4 was 15. These values, relating to
the period between the demobilization after World War II and the Korean War, are atypically low.
The data on G and Q come from Balke and Gordon 1986b for 1920-38 (in 1972 dollars) and
the Economic Report 1988 for 1948-82 (in 1982 dollars). Recall that G covers state and local as
well as federal government purchases; for the latter alone, a much larger and longer upward trend
and much more pronounced countercyclical movements in the ratio to GNP can plausibly be
estimated (see n. 17 and text below).101 The Modem Evolution of U.S. Economic Fluctuations
3.4 Institutional Changes and Financial Instability
3.4.1 Federal Budget since 1869: Growth and Cyclicality
Persistently large federal budget deficits occurred in the period 1879-1945
only during the two world wars and in the depressed 1930s (Firestone 1960).
A balanced budget was viewed as a requirement of sound fiscal policy. Sur-
pluses rose during expansions when the tax base broadened; they declined and
occasionally yielded to deficits contractions when the tax base narrowed.
These stabilizing elements of fiscal response to cyclical change played a mi-
nor role as long as the federal budget balances were very small and mostly
positive.
Table 3.4 documents the huge growth ofthe federal budget from 2%-3% of
GNP in 1869-1914 to 5%-6% in 1920-38 and 17%-23% in 1948-82.17 Re-
ceipts differed from expenditures on the average by less than 1% of GNP in
both the peak and trough years of the twelve business cycles of 1869-1914.
Small surpluses prevailed in 1920-27 and larger deficits in the depressed
1930s. In 1948-61, the budget was in the red during recessions and in the
aftermath ofthe Korean War but still in the black at other times. However, the
surpluses were relatively small even at the top of the cycle, except for 3.2%
in 1948. During the long expansion of the 1960s, there were only two years
of balanced budgets and one of a surplus, but there were five of much larger
deficits. Since 1970, deficits have occurred every year, ranging from less than
1% of GNP in the peak years 1973 and 1979 to more than 4% in the trough
years 1975 and 1982.
The peak-trough differences reflect the cyclical or "passive" component of
the measured deficit, which is closely associated with changes in the relation-
ship between personal disposable income and GNP. In recessions, taxes fall
more than proportionately with income, and transfer payments rise as more
people collect unemployment insurance and benefits from welfare programs
and social security. Hence disposable income declines much less than GNP. In
expansions, disposable income rises less than GNP because of the faster
growth oftaxes and the decline in transfers.
Regressions of annual changes in real aggregates suggest that each $1 rise
(fall) in GNP raised (lowered) disposable income by 76 cents in 1898-1926,
95 cents in 1923-40, but only 39 cents in 1949-82 (De Long and Summers
1986a, p. 694). These are rough estimates owing to the weakness in the early
data, but there are no good reasons to doubt the existence of a major change
ofthis sort between the pre- and post-World War II periods. 18
17. The percentage increase in federal expenditures between 1929 and 1986 was more than 5
times as large as that in state and local expenditures. Federal transfer payments, small before
World War II, grew more than twice as fast as federal purchases of goods and services between
1948 and 1982.
18. Some recent results relying on neoclassical models of intertemporal substitution of labor,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.103 The Modem Evolution of U.S. Economic Fluctuations
3.4.2 Automatic Stabilizers
The cyclical changes in tax receipts and transfer payments represent the
"automatic stabilizers" that rose to prominence in the first two decades ofthe
postwar era. The term sums up what is probably the most familiar and widely
accepted ofthe hypotheses that attempt to explain the moderation ofbusiness
cycles in this period. The personal income tax emerged as the largest source
of federal revenue with a progressive rate structure, hence as the main stabi-
lizer. The corporate income tax, though much smaller and more nearly pro-
portional, is more elastic cyclically because corporate profits rise and fall
much more than any other type of income when the economy expands and
contracts. At the same time, the flow of dividend payouts to stockholders
tends to be generally well maintained. Large stabilizing effects on disposable
income of changes in corporate and personal taxes and unemployment bene-
fits were found early by econometricians (Duesenberry, Eckstein, and Fromm
1960).
Insofar as households' earnings effectively limit their expenditures, the
diminution of the response of disposable income to cyclical changes in GNP
implies a dampening of fluctuations in consumption. Although the liquidity
constraints must have declined as consumers' wealth and creditworthiness
rose, it is not surprising that they still appear to affect aggregate consumption
substantially (as shown in Flavin 1981). Presumably many households of
modest means and uncertain prospects simply cannot save enough during ex-
pansions or borrow enough during contractions to make their outlays as
smooth and independent ofcurrent incomes as envisaged by the basic versions
ofthe permanent-income and life-cycle theories.
According to estimates from an annual macroeconomic model, the multi-
plier effects on real GNP ofan exogenous increase in real government expend-
itures fell from 3.2-5.1 in 1926-40 to 1.6-2.5 (Hickman and Coen 1976, p.
194). This is based on a simulation of high-employment conditions in the
prewar period: data unadjusted for the massive unemployment and excess ca-
pacity in the 1930s produce much higher prewar multipliers. The strong de-
cline in the multipliers is attributed entirely to the built-in stabilizers of the
tax-transfer system. The consumption function itself was not a source of the
observed stabilization.
The active and passive components ofthe budget deficit are ofcourse unob-
served, and it is an important caveat that the distinction between the two is
difficult to define and implement statistically. The active component is identi-
fied with the full-employment or structural surplus (deficit). That is, estimates
expenditures (viewed as truly exogenous) was stable before and after 1945 and dampened rather
than multiplicative. However, work along these lines (Hall 1980b; Barro 1981b) yields estimates
with very high standard errors for total government spending and does not necessarily contradict
the view that built-in stabilizers improve macroeconomic performance.104 Chapter Three
of how taxes and expenditures react to macroeconomic change are used to
calculate what the budget balance would be if the entire labor force was em-
ployed at the prevailing incentives to work and all existing capital was in use.
Then the cyclical component is taken to equal the difference: full-employment
deficit minus actual deficit. But the basic assumptions of this approach, that
the trend of the economy is one of full employment and separable from busi-
ness cycles, have been questioned. Measures of the economy's potential,
whether in terms of output or employment, are of uncertain quality, hence so
are the related fiscal variables, probably a fortiori.
Despite these problems, the fiscal decomposition calculus yields interesting
uniformities. Table 3.5 is a summary of changes in the real federal budget
balance and its estimated active and passive components during the cyclical
contractions and expansions in real GNP, 1948-86. Negative (positive) en-
tries in the budget columns represent shifts in the direction ofdeficit (surplus).
The early postwar recessions were associated with shifts from surplus to defi-
cit; the later ones with rising deficit. Opposite changes occurred during expan-
sions, except that the deficit rose in the Korean War period and, on an excep-
tionally large scale, in the 1980s. Also note that the fiscal changes were
generally large relative to the cyclical declines but small relative to cyclical
rises in real GNP.
The changes in the passive component ofthe federal surplus were all nega-
tive during recessions and almost all positive during expansions. 19 These es-
timates suggest a strong prevalence ofautomatic stabilizing effects. The active
component declined in all contractions except 1953-54, but generally much
less than the passive component. In expansions, rises and declines in the ac-
tive component nearly canceled each other out, apart from a large negative
shift in the expansion that began in late 1982. 20 On the whole, then, the active
component contributed much less than the passive component to the move-
ment in the total surplus/deficit.
Estimates ofthis type may overstate the benefits from automatic stabilizers
because they fail to pay explicit attention to the role ofinflation. Government
tax receipts, expenditures, and budget balances all depend not only on real
economic activity but also on prices and nominal incomes. Thus, according
to the Holloway (1986) estimates scaled to the size of the economy and the
budget in the early 1980s, the deficit rose by $25-$30 billion when the unem-
ployment rate increased by 1 percentage point and fell by $7-$9 billion when
the inflation increased by 1 percentage point; each $100 billion increase in
current-dollar GNP lowered the deficit by about $34-$38 billion. These results
19. A small negative shift occurred in the short recovery ofreal GNP in 1980:2-1981:3.
20. In this incomplete phase, 1982:3-1986:1, the changes in the total real federal budget bal-
ance and its active and passive components were - 136, - 152, and + 16, respectively. Excluding
this phase, the mean changes for seven expansions, 1949-81, are real GNP, +357; total balance,
+23, active, - 4; passive, +27.105 The Modern Evolution ofU.S. Economic Fluctuations
Table 3.5 Changes in the Real Federal Budget Balance, 1948-86 (mean change
in billions of1982 dollars)
Real Federal Budget Balance
Real
GNP Total Active Passive
Eight contractions, 1948-82 - 59 -41 - 9 -32
Eight expansions, 1949-86 +361 + 3 -22 +25
Sources: Quarterly data on real GNP and the federal government budget surplus are from the
U.5. Department ofCommerce (1986 revision). The corresponding data on the active component
of the surplus are based on Federal Reserve Bank of 51. Louis estimates of high-employment
surplus (1948-54) and Holloway 1986 estimates of cyclically adjusted surplus (1955-86) as
modified in Gordon 1987 (see pp. 589-90). For the detail underlying these averages, see Zar-
nowitz 1989a, table 10.
imply automatic stabilization, given a procyclical movement ofinflation. But
when inflation accelerates during a recession, as exemplified in 1974, there is
less of a shift toward a greater deficit and therefore less of a stabilizing (or
more ofa destabilizing) effect.
During each of the four business recessions of 1970-82, nominal GNP
typically continued to rise while real GNP declined. In these years, the pro-
gressivity ofpersonal taxes geared to current-dollar incomes acquired the per-
verse effect of pushing people into higher tax brackets even though their real
incomes had fallen. In 1981, large reductions in marginal tax rates were en-
acted and tax indexation was introduced to begin in 1985. Deficits still moved
countercyclically through the recession of 1981-82 but they remained unprec-
edentedly high during the business expansion of 1983-87, averaging 4.6% of
GNP (equal to the trough year 1982 and much higher than in any previous
postwar recession).
In sum, the stabilizing effects of cyclical changes in the budget appear to
have been very important in the 1950s and 1960s, as recognized at the time.
They were probably significantly reduced by inflation and the "bracket creep"
in the 1970s and by an accelerated, long rise in deficits and the attendant
worries about the long-term consequences ofthis new trend in the 1980s.
3.4.3 Financial Crises, Banking Panics, and Deposit Insurance
No systematic relationship exists between the dates of speculative peaks
and financial crises on the one hand and the chronology of business cycle
peaks and troughs in the United States on the other (cf. lines 1-2 and 6-7 in
table 3.6A). The speculative "manias" (Kindleberger 1978) usually occurred
late in business expansions, but 1818, 1836, and 1920 represent apparent ex-
ceptions. They culminated in "crashes," that is, sharp declines in asset prices,
abrupt curtailment ofcredit, and scrambles to liquidate the speculative assets































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1893, 1907, 1921, and 1929 by intervals of 2-5 months. In 1873, the crisis
preceded the NBER peak date by a month; the 1819 and 1837 episodes fall in
years ofcontraction.
Morgenstern (1959, pp. 541-55) presents and discusses an annual chronol-
ogy ofinternational stock exchange panics, which involved massive and rapid
sales of stocks at falling prices. The high and low dates for seven Wall Street
debacles on Morgenstern's list are shown in table 3.6A, lines 3 and 4, along
with two additional declines, in 1920-21 and 1930. In each of these cases,
the market dropped sharply (line 9). Four of the nine declines have no coun-
terparts among the financial crises (cf. lines 1-2 and 3-4). The stock market
peaks in 1873, 1890, and 1907 led business cycle downturns by 8,2, and 4
months, respectively, those in 1893 and 1929 lagged by 1 month each, and
those in 1884 and 1931 occurred in midcontraction (cf. lines 3 and 7). 21
A number of severe business contractions were associated with banking
panics, that is, great surges in bank failures, runs on banks, fears of further
failures, and often widespread suspensions of convertibility of deposits into
currency. For the period covered by their monetary history, M. Friedman and
Schwartz (1963a, chs. 2-5 and 7) identify and discuss eight such panics, from
that in 1873 to the "great" one that ended in the nationwide banking holiday
in March 1933 (table 3.6A, line 5). But cumulative bank failures, panics, and
restrictions on cash payments can be traced back as far as 1814 and 1818,
before and during the long depression of 1815-21. They also occurred in
1837, after a downturn that followed the curbing of a monetary expansion,
inflationary boom, and speculation in public lands; and in 1857, when a boom
in commodities, railroad shares, and building sites broke down sharply in
midyear, to be followed by a business downswing through 1858.
No financial crises occurred for one third of a century after 1933, despite
the tumultuous nature of this period. Federal insurance of bank deposits, ef-
fective since the beginning of 1934, prevented bank panics by radically reduc-
ing both bank failures and the depositors' fears for the safety of their money.
Most ailing banks, particularly the large ones, were reorganized or merged
with sound banks to avert failure. Commercial bank suspensions averaged 635
per year in 1921-29, 2,274 in 1930-33, 54 in 1934-42, and 4 in 1943-60
(M. Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, p. 438). Total losses to depositors fell
95% between 1930-33 and 1934-42 and melted further to negligible
amounts in 1943-60.
Small depositors soon learned that they no longer bore the losses of those
insolvent banks for which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is re-
sponsible. The costs to the government, and hence to the public as taxpayers,
were very small for several decades. So it was generally accepted that the
21. Numerous studies indicate that stock price indexes are highly sensitive to changes in aggre-
gate economic activity, prospects for profits, and credit costs and availability. They tend to lead at
business cycle peaks and troughs, but not very regularly, and they have frequent "extra" move-
ments oftheir own as well (Moore 1983; Fischer and Merton 1984; Zamowitz 1987).109 The Modem Evolution of U.S. Economic Fluctuations
FDIC is the rare example of a clearly and promptly successful reform mea-
sure. Only in the 1980s did a new wave offailures offinancial (mainly thrift)
institutions reveal how large the costs to taxpayers of the federal deposit in-
surance could be. The system greatly reduced the need ofbankers to be care-
ful with other people's money and the incentives ofthe depositors to be watch-
ful. Overindebtedness, undercapitalization, poor management, and fraud
became widespread and serious problems. Risks that look acceptable in good
times often tum out to be excessive when conditions deteriorate, and there is
little that government supervision can do about it.
3.4.4 Financial Instability after the Great Depression
The depression ofthe 1930s produced a large reduction in private debt and
a temporary rise in financial conservatism. Fears of an imminent depression
were widespread and persistent in the commentaries and forecasts of the late
1940s. World War II financing left the economy awash in Treasury securities,
that is, high-quality liquid assets. Gradually the liquidity ratios of banks de-
clined as the proportion of business and consumer loans held rose at the ex-
pense ofgovernment securities; but in the 1950s and the early 1960s liquidity
was still high overall and the level ofdebt was still relatively low.
It is this prevalence of favorable balance-sheet conditions in the private
economy that is credited with the absence of financial crises in the first two
decades of the postwar era (Minsky 1980; Wolfson 1986, pp. 190-92). In
addition, presumably the strong growth of government and aggregate de-
mand, output, and profits helped, as did the fact that inflation was still re-
strained. The financial disturbances that did occur were briefand mild. 22
The first post-Depression financial crisis widely recognized as such oc-
curred in 1966 and involved a high degree ofdisintermediation-withdrawals
of funds from savings and loan associations and banks for direct investment
in the money market. The flow of credit to nonfinancial corporations fell as
much as 40% in the second halfofthe year. Monetary policy turned very tight
in May and eased only in late August and September, after banks were forced
to liquidate large amounts of their investments in government and municipal
securities. Yet no general business contraction developed, only a slowdown
in output and employment that became known as the "minirecession" of
1966-67.
22. There was a disturbance in March 1953 when the Treasury issued new 3.25%, 30-year
obligations and prices of outstanding bonds with 2.5% coupons fell sharply, but the Fed eased
promptly, which may have helped to keep the 1953-54recession mild and brief(M. Friedman and
Schwartz 1963a, pp. 612-14; Wojnilower 1980, pp. 281-82). Eckstein and Sinai (1986) define a
'"credit crunch" as a "crisis stemming from the collision ofan expanding economy with a financial
system that has been depleted of liquidity" and place the first such postwar episode in 1957 (pp.
49 and 61). But this was hardly a "crisis," only a short phase oftighter nonprice credit rationing.
In the fall of 1959, there was a more severe credit stringency and the first disintermediation as
rates on government securities rose above the regulated ceiling rates on time deposits (Wojnilower
1980, pp. 282-84). The two crunches were associated with the recessions in 1957-58 and 1960-
61, both brief, the second one very mild (see table 3.6B, lines 3-5).110 Chapter Three
Each of the next four crises (or crunches) did occur during a business con-
traction, as shown in table 3.6B (lines 1-5). Each was triggered by a particular
shock: the bankruptcy ofthe Penn Central Railroad in June 1970; news about
the effective insolvency of the Franklin National Bank in May 1974; troubles
with the First Pennsylvania Bank and crisis in the silver futures market in
March 1980; the Penn Square Bank failure and the confidence crisis connected
with large bank losses on loans to government security dealers, energy pro-
ducers, and some less developed countries in May-August 1982.
Although the disruptive events varied, the economic and financial develop-
ments that preceded and followed them had some important common charac-
teristics. The precrunch periods (table 3.6B, line 1) witnessed high levels of
real investment and inventories but declining corporate cash flows: hence the
demand for credit would increase. In addition, corporations had to borrow
funds to meet payments on increasingly burdensome debts. Banks suffered
growing losses on their business loans and tightened their lending, particu-
larly to new customers. Stock prices typically fell in sympathy but with no
clear pattern of relative timing (line 2). Curtailment of credit supply was as-
sociated with each of the more serious financial crises (line 3), and in each
case the crunch was followed by a phase ofgradual debt reduction and resto-
ration ofliquidity.
3.4.5 Business Cycles and Crises
There is no consensus on the nature of financial crises and their role in
business cycles. A good reason for this, I believe, is that there is in fact much
variety in the sources of these disorders and also in the policy reactions to
them.
An old view recently formalized in modem terms attributes financial crises
to speculative bubbles in selected asset prices driven by fads, that is, tempo-
rarily self-fulfilling mass expectations that diverge from fundamentals. 23 Here
no causal role is given to changes in macroeconomic conditions, but the finan-
cial booms and busts are seen as a potential source ofsignificant shocks to the
real economy.
Other theories relate financial instability to exogenously induced monetary
instability or endogenous economic fluctuations. A monetarist interpretation
links banking panics to prior monetary disturbances, whose real effects they
aggravate (M. Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, 1963b; Cagan 1965). Another
approach, which combines elements ofearly and Keynesian ideas, argues that
crises result from long expansions in real investment characterized by over-
confidence and overaccumulation of(to a large extent, short-term) debt. Such
expansions are terminated by cutbacks in credit supply, debt deflation, and
debt liquidation (Minsky 1977, 1980; Sinai 1976; Eckstein and Sinai 1986).
A still different emphasis is on the real effects ofchanges in the cost ofsupply-
23. See chapter 2, section 2.4.6, for more detail and references for some ofthe theories men-
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ing credit that occur during financial crises (Bemanke 1981, 1983; Hamilton
1987).
Partial evidence in support ofeach ofthese theories exists, but it is typically
limited to particular conditions or episodes. The bubble hypothesis is consid-
ered to be consistent with the occurrence ofsharp and rapid fluctuations in the
level of financial asset prices that bear no intelligible relationship to move-
ments in the economy. To give just one classic example, the record collapse
of common stock prices in October 1987 followed upon a 3-year boom that
exceeded to an extraordinary degree the concurrent expansion in output and
profits and eventually could not be justified by any reasonable prospects of
further gains in the foreseeable future. The business expansion itself was not
seriously disrupted. 24
The monetarist hypothesis relies on the effects on aggregate demand and
output ofshifts in the money supply and the money multiplier. Its assumptions
agree well with the regime of exogenous money changes and sticky prices,
but not with that of endogenous short-run monetary adjustments and flexible
prices. Under the latter, which is perhaps approximated by the gold standard,
the advantage may lie with the hypotheses that stress the role of deflationary
shocks and changes in the availability and cost ofcredit (Calomiris and Hub-
bard 1989).
How much a financial crisis matters depends in part on policy factors. Prior
restrictive actions of monetary authorities added substantially to the pressure
on banks in some instances (1966 and 1980) but not in others (1974). A
prompt intervention by the central bank as the lender of last resort and pro-
vider ofthe needed bank reserves is the one recognized way to end the imme-
diate crises and cut the losses. The Federal Reserve neglected this function in
1930-33 but not in the mid-1980s.
The relationship between financial crises and business contractions was
never as central and close as some theories would have it and should not be
overstated (see De Long and Summers 1986a, pp. 686-90). Many contrac-
tions, including some of great severity, were not associated with either mas-
sive sellouts ofilliquid assets for cash assets oreven just an imposition oftight
rationing on bank loans (some examples are found in table 3.6). Moreover,
some expansions weathered financial problems no less grave than those that
occurred in recessions. 25
24. Although some warnings of an impending global disaster appeared in the press right after
the crash, most professional forecasters only reduced their positive growth forecasts for the year
ahead (Zarnowitz 1987). The actual outcome was merely small dips in the more sensitive compo-
nents ofreal consumption and investment around the end of 1987. In contrast, the previous record
panic in the market, that ofOctober 1929, occurred in what turned out to be the initial stage ofthe
Great Depression.
25. Recent examples include the drain ofuninsured deposits from the Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank in May 1984 and the run on state-insured savings banks in Ohio in March 1985. These
incidents show (1) that the system remains sensitive to confidence crises and (2) that the lattercan
be prevented from spreading into major panics by credible insurance of deposits and, when
needed, lender-of-Iast-resort actions ofsupplying additional reserves to banks.112 Chapter Three
These caveats notwithstanding, a reduction in the frequency or intensity of
financial disturbances could certainly have a significant impact on the econ-
omy (points IIIB and VIA in section 3.2.1). Table 3.6 lists percentage changes
in (1) liabilities ofbusiness failures, (2) the stock price index, and (3) the ratio
ofdeposits to currency, for each ofthe periods covered. These are all sensitive
measures of the effects of financial or banking crises, with long records. 26
Each indicates that the disorders in speculative asset and credit markets were
much more severe historically than in recent times.
Thus, total-failure liabilities more than doubled in each ofthe six crises of
1884-1932 (counting 1929-32 as one episode) and more than quadrupled on
two of these occasions (table 3.6A, line 8). The mean amplitude of these
movements was 189%, or 27% per month. The postwar rises in liabilities
were on average longer but smaller (table 3.6B, line 6). Here the total mean
amplitude was 126%,which is about 2/ 3 of the figure for the financial crisis
years of 1884-1932. The postwar per-month amplitude was 11%, which is
about 'Yto ofits historical counterpart. ~
The declines in stock prices averaged 31% for the panics of 1873-1931 and
21% for the bear markets of 1957-82 (for the individual measures, see table
3.6A, line 9, and 3.6B, line 7). The postwar-to-prewar average ratio total
amplitudes is here again close to 2/ 3, that of the mean per-month amplitudes
close to 'Yto. In sum, the recent market contractions were longer but smaller
and gentler than those associated with the historical crises or panics.
Finally, declines in the deposit-currency ratio (DIC) occurred.in each ofthe
banking crises or panics of 1890-1933 as well as in 1920-21 and 1929,
whereas 1873 and 1884 witnessed at least slowdowns in the rising trend ofDI
C (table 3.6A, lines 5 and 10). On the other hand, DIC increased in each of
the postwar credit crunches except 1966 and 1973-75 (table 3.6B, lines 1 and
8). The contrast between the historical and recent behavior of DIC is clear
from the following mean-amplitude measures: 1873-1933, - 11%; 1957-82,
+3%. Evidently, the FDIC reform succeeded in eliminating the massive runs
on the banks caused by widespread fears oflosses on uninsured deposits.
26. The liabilities act as an early leading indicator whose countercyclical movements reflect
more the changes in size than the number ofbusiness failures (Zamowitz and Lerner 1961). They
tend to rise only modestly during mild contractions but explosively during severe contractions
accompanied by much financial strain.
Stock prices are an important expectational or symptomatic, rather than causal, factor in rela-
tion to aggregate economic activity, despite their presumed effects on real investment (Fischer and
Merton 1984). Their variability was exceptionally high during the 1930s but not significantly
different in the periods before the First and after the Second World War (Officer 1973; Schwert
1988). The argument that this indicates a lack of stabilization in real activity in the postwar era
(Shapiro 1988) is not persuasive. First, it overstates the closeness ofthe relationship between the
market and the economy. Second, it ignores the likelihood that the market has grown more sensi-
tive to movements in cyclical and policy indicators as the volume, quality, and currency of the
data all increased greatly in the last half-century.
The DIC ratio is an indicator ofchanges in the confidence depositors have in the safety oftheir
"money in the bank." For banks, large drops in DIC mean losses of both deposits and reserves,
transitory rises in the deposit-reserve ratio, and an urgent need to acquire liquidity.113 The Modern Evolution ofU.S. Economic Fluctuations
3.5 Macroeconomic Policies and the Business Cycle
3.5.1 Fiscal Policy: Motivations, Potential, and Record
The idea that government policies should be used to offset fluctuations in
aggregate private demand was inspired by attempts to combat the depressions
of the interwar period. 27 Although the Employment Act of 1946 called for
promotion of "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power,"
many years elapsed before the objective of macroeconomic stabilization
gained practical acceptance in the political process. Thus, not until the first
halfofthe 1960s was tax policy deliberately used to increase employment.
The effective use of discretionary countercyclical policies is impeded by
the variability oflags with which they operate and the limitations ofeconomic
forecasting. The difficulty of predicting the timing of a downturn is such that
it is usually late during or after a recession that the administration may decide
to ask for a tax cut or a program of increased expenditures. Congressional
action will require more time. Hence, even if the taxpayers and beneficiaries
of federal expenditures responded promptly with more spending, which is
uncertain, the total lag is often apt to be so long as to make the policy ineffec-
tive or even destabilizing. This would be so especially for short and mild
contractions. 28
The federal budget is the focus ofconflict about the distribution of income
and wealth as various interest groups attempt to influence its structure. Politi-
cal pressures and perceptions of public interest interact with partisan interest
and self-interest ofelected and appointed officials. The net effect ofthis clash
ofdifferent motivations and pressures must surely be to impede consensus and
impair the effectiveness of fiscal action as a tool for a discretionary stabiliza-
tion policy. Although the potential of fiscal policy to influence the economy
has grown greatly in the last half-century with the vast expansion ofthe bud-
get, the ability of the government to use this power for the public good has
not. This is attributable partly to deficient knowledge, partly to conflicting
interests, and partly to the increasing complexity of the government and its
interactions with the private economy.
The historical record is consistent with this argument. The label "too much
too late" often applies to changes in federal expenditures, notably to the pub-
lic works programs that operated with long lags, peaking in midexpansions
(Zarnowitz and Moore 1982). The cessation ofKorean hostilities in 1953 was
followed by an unnecessarily abrupt and sharp cutback in defense spending
that aggravated the 1953-54 recession. The budgetary policy of 1959-60 was
excessively tight because ofmistimed fears ofinflation and high interest rates,
27. On the early advocacy ofcountercyclical monetary policy, see Keynes 1923; on the shift to
fiscal stimulation, Keynes 1936; on the contemporaneous evolution of "classical" economists'
views on unemployment and policies, Friedman 1967; Mayer 1988; Haberler 1988.
28. Moves to raise tax rates or to reduce or discontinue expenditures on social programs or
public works, being politically unpopular, would likely involve even longer delays.114 Chapter Three
plus overoptimistic forecasts of real growth. In retrospect, it is tempting to
relate this to the weakness and shortness of the recovery of 1958-60 (see
Lewis 1962). Federal expenditures on goods and services fell in real terms
between mid-1968 and mid-1973, particularly during fiscal 1970. This may
have contributed to the recession of 1970 (Gordon 1980, p. 145), although it
did not appear to retard the expansion of 1971-73.
Tax policies fare better in postmortem appraisals, but only partially. 29 The
prompt raising of taxes in mid-1950 to finance the Korean War was a com-
mendable move. In contrast, during the Vietnam War taxes were increased too
late and inefficiently. The surcharge on the personal income tax, passed by
Congress in 1968, was temporary and recognized as such; hence its main ef-
fect was to reduce saving rather than spending, in broad agreement with the
forward-looking theories of consumption. The expiration of the surcharge in
1970 also affected primarily the saving ratio.
An activist "new economics" strategy was pursued in the 1960s to counter
the "fiscal drag" attributed to overly high levels of the high employment sur-
plus. New tax incentives to stimulate investment were legislated in 1962;
large reductions in the personal income and excise taxes in 1964 and 1965.
The result was that the initially sluggish business expansion was strengthened
and probably prolonged but also that the active component of real federal
surplus fell strongly to remain negative ever since. After 1965, the federal
budget was in deficit each year but one (1969), that is, during expansion and
contraction alike. Had fiscal policies been guided by considerations ofeither
macroeconomic stabilization or growth, they could hardly have produced this
result. 30
The tax cut of March 1975 was enacted into law at the very end of the
1973-75 recession. It was followed by further reductions in 1975-76, but the
March rebate was explicitly temporary and probably again not very effective.
Altogether, repeated errors of fiscal policy added much to the woes of the
1970s (Blinder 1979 and 1981).
3.5.2 Readings ofthe Federal Reserve Performance
Historical assessments of monetary policy often implicitly proceed from
the premise that changes in monetary aggregates strongly influence real activ-
ity in the short run and are controllable by the Federal Reserve. So the Fed is
blamed for causing cyclical instability by allowing recurrent accelerations and
29. Some tax reductions were fortuitously well-timed. This applies to the tax cut that was
enacted (over a presidential veto) in April 1948 and to the expiration ofthe Korean War taxes in
January 1954.
30. Critics often blame the "Keynesian consensus" for helping to legitimize deficit spending
intellectually, which is certainly not without some historical justification (Mayer 1988). But
Keynes favored deficits during depressions, not during prosperity. Also, the deficits persisted
under different administrations, legislatures, and ideologies. To a large extent, the explanation is
simply that fiscal actions were taken in response to immediate political concerns, which notably
include vocal demands for lower taxes orcurrently needed government services.115 The Modem Evolution ofU.S. Economic Fluctuations
decelerations in the trend of the money stock. Drops in the money growth
rates are viewed as leading to major slowdowns, as in 1966, or recessions, as
in 1957, 1960, 1970, and 1980-81; sharp rises, to "overheated" expansions,
as in 1967-68 and 1972-73 (see, e.g., Gordon 1980). Larger and more per-
sistent errors ofmonetary policy are held accountable for the greater cyclical
instability ofthe past (Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, 1963b).
Monetary policy is clearly more focused on short-term stabilization than
fiscal policy is, for several reasons. The governing bodies ofthe Federal Re-
serve System being relatively small and the influence ofthe chairperson often
strong, their decisions can be reached much more quickly than those of the
Congress. The Fed is presumably less subject to diverse political pressures.
Conflicts between bureaucratic self-interest and public interest are probably
less frequent and sharp here than in the fiscal area (Willett 1988). Yet, great
obstacles to effective monetary control remain as a result of deficient knowl-
edge, uncertainty, and indecisiveness in the face ofcostly alternatives.
There is much that is simply not well understood about the role ofmoney-
most important, to what extent it is active rather than passive. Even econo-
mists who believe money matters a great deal disagree on how best to define
it and agree that monetary policy operates with long and variable lags. There
are always alternative forecasts with nonnegligible probabilities of occur-
rence, and alternative courses ofpolicy, each ofwhich imposes different costs
on different classes ofpeople. Hence, monetary policymakers will often differ
on when to do what, seek more evidence and consensus, delay hard decisions,
or proceed piecemeal. They may be unable to "take charge" in time, so their
actions may be too weak to prevail or have too slow and hence unintended
effects. Such outcomes have received less attention than they deserve. 31
Another possibility is that the Federal Reserve is unwilling to assert active
control over money. If its main concern is with the stability of interest rates
and ifthe cyclical shifts in income and money demand are caused by fluctua-
tions in the quantities of goods and services people want to buy, then money
supply will simply accommodate these shifts. 32 In fact, these conditions were
probably often closely approximated in recent times. Interest rates were
pegged low during the war-dominated 1940s and early 1950s, after which the
Fed used money market indicators in operating procedures that let money sup-
ply behave procyclically and were consistently attacked by monetarist critics.
In the 1970s, the Fed set monetary aggregate targets as well as a federal funds
target but observed mainly the latter. After October 1979, nonborrowed re-
31. The early monetarists' emphasis on the interrelated problems ofuncertainty, ignorance, and
lags led them only to reject activist policies, not to question whether, under discretionary policies,
monetary changes have dominant short-termeffects on economic activity (see, e.g., Laidler 1981,
esp. p. 19).
32. In terms ofthe still widely used macroeconomic model ofHicks 1937, this is the case where
the demand for goods fluctuates more than the demand for money (the IS curve is more unstable
than the LM curve) and the Federal Reserve pursues the policy oftargeting interest rates by open-
market operations in government securities (Poole 1970).116 Chapter Three
serves were used for three years as the main target, and interest rates began to
swing widely, but the fluctuations in monetary growth also increased greatly.
In effect, much of the time, changes in the credit extended by banks deter-
mined the changes in the money supply.
Figure 3.3 shows that monetary growth rates have been on average larger
and more volatile in the second than in the first halfofthe post-1945 era, but
also that the relative changes in M2 were much more variable yet before World
War I and, especially, in the interwar period. Was it the ineptness of the Fed-
eral Reserve System that caused the apparent rise in monetary instability in
the early 1920s and then, a fortiori, in the 1930s? And was it the improved
Fed policy that caused the apparent post-World War II stabilization? The no-
tion that the monetary authorities performed first so poorly and then so much
better almost continuously over such long periods of time seems rather far-
fetched. It seems easier to explain the record by recognizing that monetary
change is in large measure endogenous (see sec. 3.5.3). But this does not by
any means imply that Federal Reserve actions were unimportant. In particular,
the fact that no significant periods ofnegative monetary growth rates occurred
after 1948-49 is very probably related to successful preventive actions by the
Fed. By the same token, the Fed must also bear the primary responsibility for
the inflationary upward tilt in money growth during the last 30 years. Changes
in the monetary regime can have strong effects on the economy's structure and
responsiveness (see sec. 3.5.4).
3.5.3 Money and Economic Activity: Some Short-Run Dynamics
For the effects of money on income to dominate the reverse effects, the
demand function for money must be reasonably stable over time and the sup-
ply function must include at least one critical factor independent ofthe deter-
minants of demand. It is the central bank that is seen as providing that factor
through its control over the monetary base.
Evidence available through 1973 favored a simple and stable money de-
mand function ofthe form
(1)
where all variables are in logs and M, P, Q, and i denote the money stock, the
price level, output, and the interest rate, respectively.33 However, after 1974
equation (1) went astray by systematically overpredicting demand deposits.
This prompted an intensive but on the whole frustrating search for improved
specifications (Judd and Scadding 1982.) After 1981 the apparent shortfall of
33. This is a short-run formulation in which portfolio adjustment costs are assumed to cause a
given lag pattern in the reaction of real balances to changes in either Q or i (Goldfeld 1973).
Somewhat different dynamic specifications are obtained when the gradual adjustment is assumed
to occur instead in nominal balances (Goldfeld 1976), the price level (Laidler 1980), or both
(Gordon 1984b). Q is usually represented by real GNP, P by the implicit price deflator, and M by
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the demand for Ml was replaced by an excess. The velocity ratio, GNP/Ml,
instead of following a long upward trend, started drifting downward. The
probable sources ofthe observed instability ofmoney demand are diverse and
time specific: financial deregulation and innovations, changes in the Fed's tar-
gets, and the shift from rising to declining inflation. 34
Money supply can be viewed as the product of the money multiplier, fJ-
(which depends on the reserve-deposit, RID, ratios chosen by banks and on
the CID ratios chosen by households and firms), and the base, B (which
depends mainly on Federal Reserve dynamic and defensive operations).
The theory predicts that money supply is positively related to i, the level of
market interest rates (apart from any influence of i on the conduct of mone-
tary policy). 35
Attempts to estimate separately money demand and money supply func-
tions encounter grave problems ofsimultaneity and identification (Cooley and
LeRoy 1981). Suppose the Fed follows an interest-rate stabilization strategy
with the target value i:;. Then
(2)




where hI = J3 + lin, h2 = lin, and VI = E~ - E~. Although iidoes not appear in
equation (1), one cannot reasonably assume it to be independent ofthe unob-
served determinants of money demand. If, say, money demand increases, ex-
erting an upward pressure on iI' then according to equation (2) the Fed will
either accommodate the shift orrevise iior use some balanced combination of
the two moves. As this indicates, correlations are likely to exist between u1
and B1, i1 and ii, and u1 and VI·
Monetary policy is more complicated than equation (2) implies: although
often accommodative, it has at times attempted to be countercyclical. To ap-
proximate the latter case, allow for partial responses to B1 to output, Ql' and
34. See Gordon 1984b for a comprehensive and discerning analysis ofthe dynamics ofmoney
demand. OUf derivations in the text below resemble some of his. Gordon's empirical work pro-
ceeds by successive approximations that yield statistically significant improvements but at a con-
siderable loss ofsimplicity.
35. A rise in i creates incentives for the banks to increase their borrowing from the Fed and to
decrease their excess reserves; it may also cause the public to reduce their holdings oftime depos-
its relative to checkable deposits. In practice, however, most of these effects (which would raise
either B or J.1 and hence M) are likely to be weak most ofthe time because they rely on changes in
interest differentials (i relative to the discount rate or deposit rates) that will be small and short
lived, at least without certain working regulatory restraints. Also, excess reserves are apt to be
small and mostly random, except in depressions following financial crises.118 Chapter Three
inflation, P t - Pt - 1, both with negative signs. Incorporating equation (3) as
well, the result is a money supply function ofthe following type:
(5)
This equation resembles equation (1) closely. In fact, the two include the
same variables, except for lags that probably belong in both functions. 36 A
reasonable inference is that shifts in the demand for money are apt to be re-
lated to shifts in the policy reaction functions, or "monetary regimes," so that
the two are difficult to separate (Gordon 1984b).
The most probable explanation of the historical correlation of short-term
changes in money and real activity is a composite one. First, much ofthe time
both money and output respond to the common influence of whatever forces
drive the prevailing movement of the economy. For example, an investment
boom is financed by credit expansion. Second, changes in output and income
may affect monetary growth directly. The volume of inside money can adjust
to the level of real activity, and it is inside money in the form of various de-
posits that constitutes the bulk of the total stock of money. The composition
ofmonetary aggregates changes endogenously, and the stability ofmoney de-
mand is not assured. Third, as noted before, the Fed may target interest rates;
ifit aims at stabilizing the dollar under a fixed exchange rate or a "dirty float"
system, the results will be similar. All these cases require an accommodative
central-bank policy, and they are in practice very difficult to distinguish from
each other.
Fourth, at least some ofthe time monetary authorities take the initiative in
altering the course of money targets and the economy for better or worse.
These actions may be episodic but they tend to be ofgreat practical and theo-
retical interest. Here, unlike in the other cases, it is the aggregate activity that
adjusts to the monetary change instead ofthe other way around.
3.5.4 Monetary Regime Changes
Monetary institutions and rules of conduct evolve historically and at times
undergo major episodic shifts that result in different monetary regimes. There
are related changes in the organization ofthe foreign-exchange market, bank-
ing and investment finance, and government fiscal operations. Ifthe way eco-
nomic policies are carried out is altered, and a new monetary or fiscal or ex-
change regime is established, the informed public will adjust its expectations
and behavior accordingly over time (Lucas 1976). This raises the question of
what relationship can be found between such regime shifts and the differences
between business cycles in the prewar, interwar, and postwar periods.
36. The distinction between real and nominal balances is not very helpful in dealing with short-
run changes, given the sluggishnessofprice reactions in countries with relatively low and not very
volatile inflation. Under these conditions, too, expected inflation will not be an important addi-
tional factor in the money demand function.119 The Modem Evolution of U.S. Economic Fluctuations
Before World War I
From 1879 to 1914, the United States was on the gold standard: the dollar
was convertible into gold at a fixed legal ratio, and the money stock and price
level had to be consistent with an approximate balance in international pay-
ments maintained without abnormally large gold movements. So money was
basically endogenous. Central banks influenced the international capital mar-
kets through interest-rate manipulations to keep the exchange rates fixed.
Their role as monetary authorities was thus limited and so was the role ofthe
U.S. Treasury. Variations in gold supply and demand (discoveries and changes
in technology of production and use) resulted in changing trends in money
supply and prices.
The rate ofgrowth in the stock ofM2 dropped below zero on five occasions
between 1875 and 1918, each time during a severe business contraction (fig.
3.3A). Milder recessions were marked by smaller declines in positive rates of
money growth. The data leave no doubt about the predominantly procyclical
behavior of this variable (see also table 3.1, line 9, and table 3.2, line 10).
But this pattern of movement in the rate ofchange in M2 can be attributed to
procyclical fluctuations in the currency-money (CIM) ratio and the RID ratio,
not to the behavior of the monetary base (B), which under the gold standard
was on the whole acyclical (see Cagan 1965, chs. 2 and 3). Changes in B (the
"high-powered" money, which in this period included the public's holdings of
gold coin or certificates, Treasury currency, and national bank notes) reflected
mainly the changes in gold stock dominated by long trends. According to the
vector autoregression (VAR) equations for rates of change in output (q),
money (m2), and base (b) in 1886-1914, q was influenced significantly by
lagged values by m2 but not b (see chapter 12).
The business cycles ofthe four decades before World War I were relatively
frequent and characterized by several serious depressions and financial panics;
they were much discussed by contemporaries with reference to the instability
of bank credit rather than money supply, of commodity and asset prices as
much as ofoutput. Business expansions were seen as phases ofrising demand
for both credit (as investment rose) and currency (as wages and consumer
spending rose). They would be curtailed by shortages of bank reserves and
high real costs or low availability ofcredit. These ideas (elements or variants
ofwhich are found, e.g., in Sprague 1910; Hawtrey 1913; and Mitchell 1913)
can help explain the cyclical behavior ofthe CIM (or CID) and RID ratios.
The wholesale price index tended to move procyclically around a down-
ward trend in 1875-96 and around an upward trend in 1896-1914. Over the
period as a whole, positive and negative rates of change in the index nearly
offset each other, according to the average amplitudes of both quarterly and
cyclical measures (see table 3.1, line 5, and table 3.2, line 7). Commodity
prices generally had a high degree ofcyclical flexibility, and deflations inter-120 Chapter Three
acted with restrIctions on credit supply in contributing to major business
downturns. 37
Short-term interest rates moved up in business expansions and down in con-
tractions, with lags at turning points, but the quarterly changes in them were
very volatile and almost symmetrically distributed between rises and declines
(table 3.1, line 13, and table 3.2, line 13; fig. 3.4A). As there was no persis-
tent inflation in this period, there was no reason to expect such an inflation to
arise, and none did.
Between the World Wars
The interwar period saw a great weakening of the international gold stan-
dard and the link between U.S. money and international trade. In 1933 the
dollar ceased to be freely convertible into gold, which was eliminated from
circulation. The Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914 but came
into its own only in the 1920s (during both world wars the financing needs of
the Treasury were dominant). The two decades after 1919 include a period of
relatively high economic and monetary stability in 1922-29, but they also
provide two examples of major errors of monetary policy followed by severe
business contractions: the sharp rises in the discount rates in January and June
1920 and the doubling of legal reserve requirements in 1936-37. The huge
decline in the money stock during the depression of the early 1930s was
driven mainly by the increases in the C/D and R/D ratios caused by the bank-
ing crises; the monetary base actually increased. 38
On the whole, the fluctuations in monetary growth rates were clearly largest
in the interwar period and smallest in the postwar period, and much the same
applies to the fluctuations in the rates ofchange in output and prices (cf. figs.
3.1, 3.2, and 3.3). In contrast, changes in interest rates were not particularly
large in 1919-33, and they then became very small and mostly negative, even
during the cyclical expansion of 1933-37. They were on average smaller in
the interwar period than in the earlier and later eras (fig. 3.4; tables 3.1 and
3.2, lines 13-15).
The interwar estimates in chapter 12 ofthis volume suggest that q was sig-
nificantly affected by lagged growth rates in base and monetary growth but not
by interest rates. This is unlike the estimates for both 1886-1914 and 1949-
82, which show strong net effects ofinterest rates on output.
37. A very special episode is the long business contraction of 1873-79, which witnessed a
persistent and sharp decline in prices but apparently, much of the time, rising output (see figs.
3.IA and 3.2A; and Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, chart 3 and text in ch. 2). This was the end of
the "greenback period," characterized by political controversy over the resumption ofspecie pay-
ments, rather mild and vacillating movements in monetary aggregates and great financial instabil-
ity (the 1873 crisis, rises in the RID and CIDI ratios, and bank failures).
38. Between the business cycle peak in August 1929 and the banking crisis in October 1930,
the base declined 4.7% while M2 slipped 2.6%; between October 1930 and the business cycle
trough in March 1933, the base rose 23.4% while M2 dropped 35.2% (data from Friedman and
Schwartz 1963a, table A-I, col. 8, pp. 712-13, and table B-3, col. I, pp. 803-4). To be sure, the
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After World War II
The adherence to a program of strict support of government bond prices
reduced the Federal Reserve to the passive role of an adjunct to the Treasury
Department in the 1940s and until the March 1951 Accord: a time of war-
induced expansion and inflation, a brief war-end contraction, and the last de-
flationary recession in 1948-49. The United States became the dominant eco-
nomic power and the trading world was effectively on a dollar standard before
and after the main European currencies returned to convertibility in 1958. The
1950s and 1960s saw great economic recoveries in Western Europe and Japan,
and a remarkably high and stable real growth in the United States by historical
standards, despite the shocks ofthe Korean and Vietnam wars and three reces-
sions between 1953 and 1961. The stock ofmoney grew at stable and moder-
ate rates, which however began to show a rising trend in the 1960s. After the
Korean inflation and disinflation, prices generally displayed stability, rising
very little before 1960 and still slowly for several years thereafter. Interest
rates resumed their cyclical pattern but remained low until the later 1960s,
when inflationary expectations began to be clearly reflected in the data (see
figs. 3.1-3.4).
In the face of past setbacks and expected difficulties of monetary policy-
making, the Federal Reserve authorities, not surprisingly, showed much un-
certainty and caution in the early postwar period, paying most attention to
interest and credit changes and often yielding to the growing fiscal activism.
The public availability of frequent monetary data, though helpful, may have
also had some intimidating effects (see Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, pp.
637-38). It would be incorrect to credit the successes ofthis period to mone-
tary activism, which was largely absent. But the caution and passivity seem
to have worked well much of the time under the highly favorable conditions
then prevailing, which merits recognition.
The environment deteriorated rapidly in the late 1960s and 1970s for sev-
eral familiar reasons: the decline in U.S. comparative international advantage
and the dollar, the breakdown ofthe Bretton Woods system, the experimenta-
tion with price and wage controls, the supply shocks, the reduced productivity
growth, and rising financial instability. But the main factor underlying the
problems of this period was the rising trend and volatility of inflation, which
resulted in persistent inflationary expectations and heightened uncertainty
about the general economic outlook. For this, much of the blame was natu-
rally laid on the purportedly countercyclical and oscillating but mostly too
expansionary monetary policy actions. The turn to a policy of reducing
money growth in 1979-82 contributed to the business contractions of 1980-
82 but also helped to produce the major disinflation of the first half of the
1980s.
The test statistics for the VAR model in chapter 12 indicate that in 1949-82
output (q) was strongly influenced by interest rates as well as by a leading122 Chapter Three
index reflecting mainly real investment and related production and employ-
ment decisions. The direct effects of changes in monetary aggregates were
significant but comparatively weak.
3.5.5 Gains in Confidence
There are good reasons to believe that the generally favorable trend of
events between the late 1940s and the late 1960s has gradually produced a rise
in public optimism that economic growth and prosperity can be maintained
and recessions can be kept mild and short. In the spirit ofself-fulfilling expec-
tations, such a rise in optimism would be apt to encourage productive activity
and enterprise.
Thus, the Standard and Poor's index of common stock prices moved
strongly upward throughout this period, and its cyclical declines were short
and relatively mild despite its high sensitivity. 39 The Survey Research Center
index of consumer sentiment, available since 1952, averaged as high as 91
(1966:1 = 100) in its first 10 years and 96 in 1962-68, even though it too fell
significantly in each recession and in the minirecession of 1966, leading at the
business cycle turns. This index depends inversely on unemployment and in-
flation, positively on stock prices and its own lagged value (Lovell 1975).
By the same measures, investor and consumer confidence suffered serious
setbacks during the years 1969-80. The S&P index had no trend but early and
long recession-bound declines in 1969-70 and 1973-74 (also a lengthy extra
one in 1977). The SRC index, similarly, had long and large contractions in
1969-70 and 1972-75; moreover, its expansions in this period were relatively
weak and short (1971-72, 1975-77). Presumably, the public's perceptions and
expectations were depressed because ofa succession ofbad economic, finan-
cial, and energy news. Inflation was not only rising but also becoming more
volatile, which increases uncertainty (see chapter 17). Interest rates had a
steepening upward trend and large fluctuations around it, in contrast to their
earlier restraint.
However, considering its length and severity, the 1981-82 recession was
associated with a relatively mild decline in stock prices and a remarkably short
and small decline in consumer sentiment. The bull market came back to stay
in the 1980s, surviving even the debacle of August-October 1987. The con-
sumer sentiment index recovered quickly in 1982-83 and remained very high
during 1984-88. There is little doubt about the reasons for the new rise in
optimistic attitudes and expectations: disinflation and downward movements
in interest rates and unemployment. Despite the depressant effects from news
ofhigh budget and trade deficits, and a rising debt, another wave ofpessimism
arose only after a long period ofsluggish growth and recession in 1989-91.
39. The downturns in the index anticipated each ofthe four recessions, and the upturns antici-
pated each ofthe four recoveries of 1948-61, plus two episodes ofslowdown-speedup sequences
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In sum, persistent changes in the economy's performance can have impor-
tant effects on the confidence of consumers, investors, and business execu-
tives. The process ofrecognition and reaction to the changes involves lags of
uncertain but probably substantial length. All this seems entirely consistent
with rational behavior, without requiring an implausibly high degree of fore-
sight.
According to the hypothesis V in section 3.2.1, if recessions are expected
to be shorter and milder, they will be so because people will see less reason to
curtail or postpone spending; hence consumption will slow less and invest-
ment will decline less. Baily (1978) argues that private behavior has indeed
changed in this direction during the 1950s and 1960s as people learned to
believe that monetary and fiscal policies are capable of keeping the economy
close to the full-employment targets. He shows the employment reactions to
changes in output and inventory reactions to changes in final sales were
weaker in 1962-71 than in 1948-61. But these results are also consistent with
the broader hypothesis stated above. Private economic behavior may have
changed in response to the general climate of greater stability rather than be-
cause ofconfidence in the efficacy of government policies. When the climate
deteriorated in the 1970s and public interest shifted to the seemingly unyield-
ing problem of inflation, private confidence and supportive behavior seem to
have decreased markedly. The rising budget deficits have probably under-
mined the belief in flexible countercyclical uses of fiscal policy. The popular
credibility of monetary policy was at least temporarily restored in the 1980s,
after what was widely viewed as the success ofthe Federal Reserve in reduc-
ing inflation and managing the long business expansion.
3.6 Conclusions
1. A review ofdata and results reported in the literature reveals great diver-
sity of cyclical experience both in more distant and in recent U.S. economic
history. The postwar period as a whole, however, has been one of distinctly
reduced instability when compared with earlier times.
2. Significant net stabilizing effects can be attributed to shifts in the struc-
ture of employment to less cyclical industries, which produce mainly ser-
vices, and, up to a point, to the increased size of the acyclical government
sector.
3. The fiscal automatic stabilizers played an important positive role, mainly
in the 1950s and 1960s, before the rise in inflation and the consequent distor-
tions.
4. The smoother functioning of the financial system helped reduce overall
instability. Most of the credit here goes to federal deposit insurance and pre-
vention ofgeneral banking panics.
5. Discretionary fiscal policies rose to prominence in the course ofthe post-
war era, but their record is very mixed. It is generally more favorable before124 Chapter Three
the mid-1960s than afterward, and also more favorable for tax policies than
expenditure policies.
6. Quarterly rates ofchange in money supply were more volatile in 1875-
1914 and, particularly, in 1919-39 than in 1946-83, although monetary
growth increased and became more variable in the second half ofthe postwar
period. These differences parallel those in output variability. The active and
passive elements in monetary (as well as fiscal) policy are both important and
intermingled, which makes it difficult to assess their effects. On balance, how-
ever, monetary policy probably made a modest contribution to the greater sta-
bility ofreal economic activity in the last 40 years.
7. Economic agents have gradually realized that business recessions have
become shorter and milder, which has strengthened their confidence and in-
duced behavior that promotes more stable growth. But expectations change
with the trend of events; for example, the rise in inflation and unemployment
during the 1970s had the opposite effects.